Beyond Soviet Stockpiles: Russia's Shift to Mass Production of Modern Arms
Despite widespread reports of significant depletion within its vast Soviet-era weapons stockpiles, Russia is embarking on an ambitious plan to dramatically increase the production of new tanks, aircraft, and advanced missile systems by the close of 2025. This critical assessment, emanating from Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (GUR), underscores Moscow’s strategic pivot towards modern manufacturing while simultaneously leveraging the enduring infrastructure of its Soviet defense industry. The implications for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and global security are profound.

Skibitskyi, in a detailed interview with Ukrinform, provided specific insights into Moscow's projected output for new military hardware. For its air force, Russia aims to manufacture 57 new modern aircraft this year, a figure that includes high-profile assets such as the stealth-capable Su-57, the multirole Su-35, the advanced strike fighter Su-34, and the versatile Su-30. This push for new aerial platforms highlights Russia's commitment to maintaining a qualitative edge in air power, integrating newer designs with proven combat capabilities.
The ground forces are also earmarked for substantial enhancements. The Kremlin reportedly plans to produce approximately 250 newly built T-90M tanks, a modern variant of its mainstay battle tank, alongside around 1,100 new armored personnel carriers, including the widely used BTR-82A models. These figures represent a considerable effort to replenish and upgrade its armored vehicle fleets. Beyond individual vehicles, Russia's production schedule includes 365 new artillery systems, a number that explicitly excludes upgraded or refurbished older variants, signaling a focus on entirely new, potentially more advanced, self-propelled and towed artillery units.
Concurrently with this new production drive, Russia is maintaining a large-scale refurbishment program for its older military hardware. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and various artillery systems that had been stored in depots prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are being brought back into service after undergoing modernization or restoration. Skibitskyi confirmed that a significant portion of the equipment entering units since the conflict's escalation originated from these stored reserves. While Ukrainian estimates suggest that between 50% and 75% of these Soviet-era stockpiles may have already been expended, the ongoing refurbishment efforts allow Russia to sustain its forces in the field, albeit with equipment of varying ages and capabilities. This dual approach – new production and old refurbishment – demonstrates Russia's multifaceted strategy to compensate for combat losses and meet ongoing operational demands.
Crucially, the resilience of the Russian defense-industrial base is a key factor enabling this renewed production surge. Skibitskyi emphasized that Russia, unlike some other post-Soviet states, largely preserved its defense industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although many enterprises experienced reduced capacity, they did not close, allowing Russia to remain a major arms exporter and, critically, to maintain crucial production lines. This continuity has provided a foundation upon which Moscow can now rebuild and expand its manufacturing capabilities, despite the immense pressures of war and sanctions.
Lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine are significantly shaping Russia's future weapon development and production priorities. There is a discernible shift towards systems that have proven particularly effective in combat, with a strong emphasis on unmanned platforms and missile systems. The Russian military is reportedly planning to manufacture nearly 2,500 "high-precision missiles" in 2025. This category includes critical strategic assets like the cruise and ballistic variants for the Iskander system, as well as the formidable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, known for their speed and ability to evade conventional defenses. Furthermore, there has been a notable increase in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with specific mention of Geran (Shahed-like kamikaze drones), Harpy (loitering munitions), and FPV (first-person view) drones, which have become integral to reconnaissance, strike, and precision attack operations on the battlefield.
Skibitskyi also highlighted a strategic adjustment in Russia’s armored warfare doctrine. The Ministry of Defense has reportedly narrowed its main battle tank inventory to three primary models: the modern T-90, the next-generation T-14 Armata (though its mass production and deployment remain limited), and the legacy T-80. This consolidation aims to streamline logistics, training, and maintenance. Similarly, artillery production is increasingly focused on newer or more heavily modernized systems such as the self-propelled Koalitsiya-SV, Msta, Malva, Giatsint, and the tracked Magnolia, indicating a drive for improved range, accuracy, and mobility in its indirect fire capabilities. These developments underscore Russia's adaptive approach, integrating battlefield experience into its long-term military industrial planning. Future Russian missile systems are slated to prioritize three key performance improvements: extended range to strike targets deeper behind enemy lines, improved accuracy to enhance lethality and reduce collateral damage, and increased warhead payload to maximize destructive potential.
Despite the comprehensive nature of Western sanctions designed to cripple Russia’s military-industrial complex, Ukrainian intelligence services believe that Moscow has managed to partially bypass these restrictions. This ability to maintain essential supply chains, potentially through third-party countries, illicit procurement networks, or the development of domestic substitutes for critical components, is crucial for sustaining large-scale weapons production. The continued flow of vital components, even at a reduced or more costly rate, allows Russia to persist in its manufacturing efforts, presenting an ongoing and evolving challenge for Ukraine and its international partners. This industrial resurgence, fueled by wartime necessity and a resilient defense sector, suggests that Russia remains committed to its military objectives and is adapting its capabilities to the demands of prolonged conflict.