Central Europe after 2022: How is the security architecture changing after Russian aggression?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a major shock to Europe's security architecture. Although Russia's earlier annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in Donbas in 2014 had already clearly violated international law and destabilised Eastern Europe, it was the full-scale invasion of a sovereign state that triggered processes in many European countries that can, without exaggeration, be described as a strategic transformation. The security policy of Central Europe, the region between Germany and Ukraine, thus took a new direction after 2022.
Germany and its strategic transformation: ‘Zeitenwende’ in practice
As the economically strongest country in Central Europe and a key member of both the EU and NATO, Germany played a special role after 2022. In his speech to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described the Russian invasion as a ‘turning point’ (Zeitenwende) in German security policy. The term quickly caught on as a slogan for an epoch-making change that was to include extensive investment in defence, a rethinking of relations with Russia and a more active stance on European and transatlantic security. At the same time, Berlin announced the creation of a special fund of €100 billion for the modernisation of the Bundeswehr – the largest one-off increase in military spending in Germany's post-war history. However, these extra expenditures caused considerable controversy, especially among the opposition at the time, as they were to be managed as so-called ‘special assets’.
Another important signal was the decision to involve Germany as the main driving force behind the European Sky Shield Initiative. However, in addition to material and organisational issues, Germany found itself in a difficult geopolitical situation. After decades of economic dependence on Russian gas and a cautious military policy, it had to redefine its role not only towards Russia but also towards Central and Eastern Europe. Poland and the Baltic states had long perceived Berlin's approach as too soft and pacifist, which led to tensions within the EU and NATO.
Poland as a new military power in the region
Since the start of the Russian invasion, Poland has established itself as the most active military power in Central Europe. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, it has advocated a tougher line towards Moscow and demanded a permanent NATO presence on its territory, but it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that created the conditions for a fundamental military shift. Warsaw embarked on an unprecedented arms programme, with the defence budget set to reach 4% of GDP in 2024, almost double the minimum threshold set by NATO. Poland has thus not only become a leader in support for Ukraine, but also a key pillar of the Alliance's eastern flank. Much has already been written about this ambitious armament plan, so I will not discuss it in detail here. At the same time, however, Poland faces challenges – rapid armament is straining state finances, the pace of training is lagging behind purchases, and domestic political polarisation is complicating the continuity of the strategy. Even so, Poland has become the most dynamic country in Central Europe in military terms and a potential ‘shield of the West’ in an era of new great power confrontation.
The Czech Republic and the transformation from an expeditionary army to a defence army
After 2022, the Czech Republic made a significant shift in its defence strategy: from its previous focus on NATO expeditionary missions to an emphasis on defending its own territory within a collective security framework. This shift was formally confirmed in the new Security Strategy of the Czech Republic of 2023, which for the first time since the end of the Cold War explicitly mentions the possibility of armed conflict in Europe as a real threat. At the same time, the government approved a law on two per cent – defence spending of at least 2% of GDP – and intensified programmes to modernise the army and support active reserves. On the other hand, the Czech Armed Forces face at least one fundamental problem, which is the long-term inability to meet the required army numbers.
Hungary as an exception to the regional trend
Hungary has taken a specific position in Central Europe, which can be described as a deviation from the general trend of strengthening collective defence. While most countries in the region have intensified their cooperation with NATO and military support for Ukraine, Budapest, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has chosen a path of restraint based on its own interpretation of national sovereignty, pragmatism and an emphasis on bilateral relations. Although Hungary remains a member of NATO and has participated in some Alliance initiatives (e.g. the European Sky Shield Initiative), it has refused to supply weapons to Ukraine and has repeatedly blocked joint EU decisions on military aid to Kyiv. In the area of defence, Hungary is implementing the Zrínyi 2026 modernisation programme, which includes purchases of Western equipment (e.g. Leopard 2A7, PzH 2000), but these acquisitions are mainly domestic in nature and are not linked to strengthening international interoperability. Hungary's foreign and security policy thus balances between loyalty to NATO and special relations with Russia, with Orbán's emphasis on energy dependence and economic cooperation with Moscow causing growing tensions within the Alliance. As a result of this policy, Hungary is perceived as the most ambivalent element of the Central European security architecture, whose position complicates the region's unified response to the Russian threat. The icing on the cake is a statement by a close advisor to Orbán that Hungary would not defend itself against a Russian attack (in order to preserve the lives of Hungarian citizens).
Slovakia between the Alliance and internal polarisation
After 2022, Slovakia found itself in a paradoxical position: while formally remaining part of NATO's collective defence and actively participating in strengthening the Alliance's eastern flank, the domestic political scene became the scene of sharp polarisation, which also affected security and defence policy. Shortly after the start of the Russian invasion, the Slovak government agreed to the establishment of a multinational NATO combat group on its territory, led by the Czech Republic. Bratislava also increased its defence spending, promised to modernise its armed forces and approved a defence cooperation agreement with the US (DCA). It thus officially aligned itself with other pro-Western states in the region. However, this strategic direction met with growing domestic opposition, which escalated after the 2023 parliamentary elections. The return of Robert Fico to the head of the government brought with it a questioning of the existing security policy and a rhetorical rapprochement with Hungary's position, i.e. an emphasis on ‘neutrality’ and calls for peace instead of support for Ukraine. Although the new government did not announce its withdrawal from any international structures, some modernisation projects were slowed down or re-evaluated. Political instability and disillusionment among part of the public with the war in Ukraine have weakened the consensus on the priority of defence. Slovakia thus finds itself in the region's security architecture between formal integration and growing internal ambivalence, which calls into question its role as a reliable partner.
Fortification of borders and construction of new defence lines
One of the most visible consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine after 2022 was the revival of the concept of physical defence of the territory – that is, the revival of the idea of fortification and the construction of static defence elements, which had long been considered obsolete in the post-Soviet space. It was Russia's field fortifications that were behind what was probably Ukraine's biggest defeat of the entire war (the failed offensive in the summer of 2023). This initiative took its most prominent form on the eastern border of the European Union, primarily in Poland, the Baltic states and, to some extent, Romania. The motivation was clear: to deter a conventional attack and slow down a possible invasion. While before 2022 these countries were part of the so-called ‘defence in depth’, i.e. relying on the rapid response of allied forces, the war in Ukraine has shown that physical infrastructure can also play a key role.
Poland has announced the construction of the so-called ‘Eastern Shield’ (Tarcza Wschód) – a system of fortifications, trench lines, minefields and defensive structures along its border with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region. The project is to be completed by 2028 and covers hundreds of kilometres of the border. Similar defence belts are being created in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, often in cooperation with NATO and using a combination of natural obstacles, technical equipment (anti-tank and anti-personnel elements) and digital surveillance systems. These efforts are not only military in nature – they also send a strong signal to the population that states take the defence of their territory seriously, while also acting as a psychological deterrent to Moscow.
It is also worth mentioning the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which was initiated by Germany and represents a significant step forward in joint European procurement and integration of air defence. It includes not only the acquisition of modern missile defence systems, but also ensuring their compatibility between NATO and EU member states. The German proposal for a European ‘umbrella’ is an attempt to ensure effective protection against ballistic missiles, which would strengthen Europe's collective defence. ESSI is an example of how regional initiatives can coexist and support a broader security framework, with Germany becoming a leader in European air defence through this initiative, further strengthening its military role in the region.
