Germany's energy policy and its geopolitical implications for security
Energy security and independence from the Russian Federation are among the most important issues in Central European security policy. Unfortunately, neighboring Germany is almost a textbook example of poorly managed energy policy. Until the Zeitenwende, the overlooked dependence on raw materials from Putin's authoritarian regime did not lead to the often-proclaimed democratization of the Russian regime, but rather to the transfer of its influence to Central European politics through the creation of a clientelist network with very serious implications for the security of the region.
These impacts include both the consequences of former Chancellor Schröder's activities and the blocking of Ukraine and Georgia's accession to NATO, with consequences that the region is still grappling with today. In this context, the Nord Stream gas pipeline project, whose main purpose was to ensure the possibility of blackmailing Central and Eastern European countries by denying them supplies, became infamous. At the same time, the aim was not to lose profits from the German market. Germany's task will be to find the ideal energy mix in the foreseeable future, which should include nuclear and renewable sources. The homework for Central Europe is to develop the strongest possible diplomatic activity to ensure that the two Nord Stream gas pipelines are never put back into operation. Otherwise, the region's security will be illusory.
Cyclical efforts to find alternative sources and the anti-nuclear movement
German energy policy is very interesting from a historical perspective. It is characterized in particular by repeated efforts to find alternative energy sources to replace coal. In the 20th and 21st centuries alone, we can find several very similar megalomaniacal projects that were always presented with enthusiasm but never fully implemented. The current much-discussed Energiewende is therefore nothing new in German energy policy and should come as no surprise. Hydroelectric and nuclear energy were presented with the same enthusiasm as the Energiewende during the 20th century. Among the arguments for the transition to hydroelectric power were independence from coal barons and geopolitical arguments that considered this resource a national asset that should be exploited. Moreover, hydroelectric power plants worked very well in the US, Switzerland, and Italy. For this reason, the plan seemed perfectly sound. However, it was so ambitious that it was never fully implemented.
German energy policy experienced similar euphoria in the 1950s and 1960s, when nuclear power took over as the promoted source of energy. Nuclear power was seen as the right future for German energy. Politicians, scientists, and journalists spoke out in its favor. The showcase for this enthusiasm was the "Atomplan," presented by the German SPD in 1956. The Atomplan promised to weaken the coal lobby through investments in nuclear energy. The ensuing nuclear age was supposed to bring a peaceful and free future. The main source of energy at the time (coal) was expected to be depleted soon. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, was seen as progressive, cheap, and inexhaustible. At the height of the nuclear age, 30% of Germany's electricity was generated by nuclear power plants.
However, this initially very positive vision encountered a number of limitations. The most serious of these was the price and the need to subsidize this source. Another very unfavorable factor was, is, and will probably always be the German public's opposition to nuclear energy. Nuclear energy has never enjoyed much support among the German public. This is best illustrated by the fact that as early as the 1950s, two-thirds of respondents associated nuclear energy with nuclear weapons, and only 8% of respondents supported its civilian use. The first serious rejection of nuclear energy appeared in connection with protests against nuclear weapons, which were common in the West at the time. It remains an interesting fact that these protests almost always focused exclusively on the need for nuclear disarmament in the West. They usually remained silent on the need to disarm the USSR. However, a much stronger anti-nuclear movement was based on fears of a nuclear accident. In the 1970s and 1980s, it even completely transformed German politics. Several decades earlier, the construction of dams and their impact on the environment had raised very similar concerns. It was for this reason that some environmentalists welcomed the construction of nuclear power plants in the 1950s. They argued that they would have a much smaller impact on the landscape. However, the fundamental turning point for the future of German nuclear energy was first the nuclear accident in Chernobyl and then in Fukushima, when it was decided to close nuclear power plants that, according to the IAEA, were among the safest in the world.
The aforementioned environmentalism could be approached either constructively or exploited as a form of subversion. Examples of constructive approaches undoubtedly include the emergence of the German Green Party and the introduction of environmental protection and future generations' human rights into politics. Less fortunate consequences include the distortion of this political demand, characterized by the gradual cultivation of negative sentiment among the German population toward nuclear energy, with the very likely goal of increasing dependence on supplies from the Russian Federation. These efforts, in the spirit of the so-called Ostpolitik, often took on very bizarre forms, with arguments such as that purchasing raw materials from the Russian Federation would gradually democratize it. However, this interpretation completely ignored the fact that the Russian Federation very skillfully exploits its energy dependence to exert pressure on its customers. It is therefore impossible not to conclude that the aim of this gradual education was to keep the general public under the impression that energy can be based almost exclusively on renewable sources and on the somewhat less touted bridging technology. Bridging technologies were always intended to be temporary; nevertheless, the energy sector could not and cannot do without them. Originally, nuclear power was supposed to play the role of a bridging technology, but with its decline, Russian natural gas gradually took over. To this end, it was necessary to present Putin's regime as a strategic partner of Germany (which was possible until Russia's invasion of Ukraine).
Nord Stream as a means of building a fifth column
The Nord Stream gas pipeline was undoubtedly one of the worst geopolitical decisions Germany has made in Central and Eastern Europe this decade. For the Russian Federation, on the other hand, it was the result of a first-rate influence operation that included both extremely careful work with German public opinion and work with the local political elite. These elites, especially former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, did not hesitate, despite strong opposition from their neighbors, to push through a project that in fact posed a serious threat to German and Central European energy security. The opposition of allies within the region is best illustrated by the position of the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Szymon Szynkowski vel Sęk did not hesitate to compare Nord Stream 2 to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This comparison aptly captured the entirely natural concerns of Central European and Baltic countries about the geopolitical implications of the Nord Stream project. The commissioning of Nord Stream, especially the second part, would completely negate their efforts to reduce their energy dependence on Russian natural gas from an economic point of view.
To illustrate this point, one need only look at the route of Nord Stream and consider why it was designed in this way. The route of both branches of the gas pipeline, which runs along the bottom of the Baltic Sea from Vyborg and Ust-Luga in Russia to Lubmin in Germany, was designed to allow the Russian Federation to continue blackmailing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe by cutting off supplies, while at the same time not depriving itself of profits from the German market. As a result, Germany naturally lost interest in security and political developments in the countries bypassed by this route. Ukraine lost transit fees and paid the highest price for the subsequent geopolitical developments. The route of the gas pipeline, as designed, greatly increased Germany's energy dependence on an unpredictable player. The Russian Federation was thus able to exploit this energy dependence almost at will to modify Germany's foreign and security policy. Another goal of the proposed route was nothing less than to prevent any Central European cooperation in the field of energy security.
The issue of energy dependence on the Russian Federation was very well explained by George Friedman, a geopolitical analyst at Stratfor. In his opinion, Vladimir Putin understood very well that the Russian Federation would never succeed in modernizing its industry, and therefore decided to exploit the dependence of some countries on Russian natural gas supplies for his own political goals. He compares the situation of countries dependent on Russian natural gas supplies to heroin addiction.
Building and operating an economy dependent on Russian natural gas supplies is, on the one hand, an attractive option. However, this dependence leads to the creation and strengthening of elites who have no interest in acting in accordance with the vital interests of their countries. In practice, this leads to self-censorship, where economic and political elites are well aware of the limited possibilities for opposing aggressive steps in Russian foreign policy and therefore prepare public opinion in advance. The subsequent careers of politicians who have made such controversial decisions, which clearly went against German and EU energy security, are particularly interesting. A prime example is former Chancellor Schröder, who played a key role in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Since 2017, Schröder has held the position of chairman of the shareholders' committee of Rosneft, where he was appointed directly by the Russian government. Vladimir Putin's confidant Igor Sechin welcomed Schröder's election to the supervisory board, arguing that Schröder could contribute to the expansion of Rosneft's business in Europe and thus give new impetus to German-Russian relations.
The issue of energy dependence and its impact on security policy is also addressed in detail by Edward Lucas, a British journalist and security expert. In this context, Lucas uses the term "pipeline politics." In practice, this is a strategy whereby the Kremlin wants not only to influence Western countries, but above all to have its people inside them, in other words to maintain strong contacts with the business and political elites.
The role of the energy sector is crucial to the success of this strategy, as it serves as a kind of networking platform for building a fifth column. These actors include, in particular, pro-Kremlin bankers and politicians who are prepared to betray their country. German business and the energy sector are among the areas where the Kremlin lobby has a very strong influence in the EU. The power of this influence has subsequently significantly distorted German foreign and security policy. Typical consequences of this lobby included Germany's initial reluctance to provide any significant support to Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states against Russia's aggressive policy. Germany's growing dependence on raw material supplies from the Russian Federation was one of the reasons why Ukraine and Georgia did not become members of the European Union and NATO. Germany (together with France) blocked the admission of both countries to NATO. Ukraine and Georgia later became victims of Russian aggression. It should therefore come as no surprise that it is politicians with strong ties to Russian energy companies who are implementing and defending this so-called policy of Central European neutrality.
German ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder became notorious in this field when, together with other members of the German SPD, he did not hesitate to voice the Russian Federation's complaints about the Czech Republic's willingness to build a missile defense system with an American radar in Brdy. It is also interesting to note that the disinformation campaign that successfully turned public opinion against the construction of the radar base in Brdy was most likely financed by the Russian energy giant Gazprom. It was also significant that Gerhard Schröder's Czech party friends were actively involved in the campaign. Schröder's statements and positions, which even after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fully support Vladimir Putin's position, are a separate issue. It remains an open question to what extent this influence has "metastasized" even deeper into German politics. It is certainly not easy to separate the influence of energy dependence from the old intelligence structures that remained active, especially in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.
It is also very worrying that Gerhard Schröder was not expelled from the German SPD, and that until the Zeitenwende, Germany took a very hesitant stance on supporting Ukraine, which had been attacked by Russia. The Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines were ultimately destroyed, with German investigators attributing responsibility for the attack to Ukraine. However, Die Welt pointed out that some German intelligence officials have doubts about Ukraine's involvement and that it could have been a false flag operation for which the Russian Federation would be responsible.
Zeitenwende is only possible with energy independence from Russia
The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a fundamental break with this very accommodating policy toward the Russian Federation. After such an unprecedented act of aggression, it was no longer morally possible to ignore energy dependence on a player who had brought back a war of conquest to Europe, destroying one Ukrainian city after another. The cabinet of Social Democrat Olaf Scholz thus ultimately contributed to the aforementioned Zeitenwende and to material and military support for Ukraine, which it had previously repeatedly blocked. The current Christian Democrat Chancellor Friedrich Merz has promised more substantial support for Ukraine. In the energy sector, he has outlined the possibility of reopening German nuclear power plants.
The influence of the pro-Kremlin lobby on German foreign and security policy is not insignificant, and we can only speculate on how constructive German foreign and security policy towards an aggressive Russia would have been before the so-called Zeitenwende if Germany had not been so dependent on the Russian Federation for raw materials at such a crucial moment as a result of its energy policy. However, if we take into account the fundamental rule of investigative journalism, "follow the money," and link it to the theses of journalist Edward Lucas and other investigative journalists, then it can be argued that Germany's foreign policy stance would have been more decisive and Russia's position in Central Europe would not have been so comfortable. Would the Czech Republic's geopolitical position in the West be an issue in every election if the lobby against the construction of a US radar base in Brdy, with links to Gazprom and the red wing of the German Social Democratic Party, had not succeeded? Would Europe have addressed the invasion of Georgia and the war in Ukraine at all if Germany had not blocked their admission to NATO?
Alternative sources versus reality
German energy policy has long been characterized by cyclical efforts to find alternative sources, which are always limited by the reality. A similar scenario has been repeated first with hydroelectric power plants, then with nuclear power, and now with bridging technology, without which the Energiewende cannot succeed. Germany's energy concept will have to resolve a dilemma involving carbon dioxide emissions reduction and energy independence from authoritarian regimes. At the same time, it will be forced to resolve the issue of maintaining the dominance of renewable sources while dealing with the population's rejection of nuclear energy. At first glance, it is clear that such a complex dilemma can only be resolved by abandoning one of these criteria in the aforementioned bridging technology. In this context, the most sensible option seems to be a mix dominated by renewable sources with nuclear energy as a bridging technology. This option would meet both climate neutrality and energy independence from authoritarian regimes. However, the question remains as to how much public opinion would accept it. The worst option, on the other hand, would be one in which Russian natural gas would once again play the role of bridging technology, regardless of the arguments put forward. The geopolitical implications of this option for Central Europe's security would be incalculable.
Central Europe's task is to prevent the resumption of Nord Stream
The future of the damaged Nord Stream gas pipeline also remains an open question. Here, the Central European states, together with the Baltic states, Scandinavia, and Ukraine, must exert the strongest possible diplomatic and media pressure on Germany to ensure that it never considers this option. If Nord Stream were to resume operations, they would then be faced with the necessity of confronting Germany with a modernized Bundeswehr, whose political representatives would often act in accordance with the Russian Federation.
About David Soukup
David Soukup graduated in political science and security studies from CEVRO University in the Czech Republic, then worked at the European Values think tank, the Center Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, and the Standing Committee on Hybrid Threats in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. He currently teaches and studies.
