How Far Could Ethiopia’s Civil War Go?
The recent eruption of the Haili Gubbi volcano in northeastern Ethiopia has further highlighted the complex situation in this country. Ethiopia has been ravaged by civil war for several years. Initially, the conflict was limited to relatively small-scale local fighting, but today it has reached such proportions that it affects virtually the whole of Ethiopia. In addition, more and more ethnic groups are joining the fighting, and according to some opinions, there is even a risk that Ethiopia as such will fall apart.
Ethiopia – a historic country full of contradictions
Ethiopia is a country of stark contrasts. On the one hand, Ethiopia is destined to become a regional, or even pan-African, power. Ethiopia is a large country with a large area (1,104,300 km²), and unlike some countries in the Sahel, which are predominantly desert, a significant percentage of its territory consists of fertile land. Thanks to this, Ethiopia has a large population, which already exceeds 120 million. Ethiopia is thus significantly more populous than nearby Egypt, with which it competes for leadership in the Northeast African region.
Economically, however, Ethiopia is one of the weaker countries, even compared to other African countries. Ethiopia still has an inefficient, largely outdated economy, and its GDP per capita is low. However, its total GDP is relatively high, giving the state more resources at its disposal, which also contributes to the growing ambitions of Ethiopian leaders.
From a political perspective, it is also significant that Ethiopia, unlike many African countries, can boast a unique tradition of statehood dating back to biblical times, to the era of King Solomon, when the first state formations emerged in Ethiopia. Even then, a dynasty was formed in Ethiopia that ruled the country until the 20th century. Ethiopia's exceptional position was further underscored by its adoption of Christianity, which it managed to maintain while the surrounding states were gradually Islamized.
It is also important that Ethiopia managed to preserve its uniqueness and independence, as it succeeded in avoiding the colonization efforts of European states in the 19th century. This also distinguishes Ethiopia from other neighboring states, which gradually became European colonies. In the 20th century, the then imperial Ethiopia became the target of Italian aggression. Although the Italians managed to defeat the weak Ethiopian army, they never succeeded in fully controlling the country. Moreover, during World War II, joint British and Ethiopian forces managed to expel the Italians from the country. Ethiopia was thus able to not only restore its statehood, but also retain its pride.
This historical tradition is very important for Ethiopia and, above all, for Ethiopians themselves. Together with the high population (which is perceived somewhat differently in this country than in Europe), it gives them a sense of exclusivity and makes them feel that Ethiopia is a superpower. Many Ethiopians—across different ethnic groups—therefore still adhere to this tradition. Individual groups also realize that if Ethiopia were to break up, they would lose this tradition, and the resulting independent states would be just a bunch of small, poor African countries. This is one of the main reasons that has so far prevented the breakup of Ethiopia.
The impending collapse of the state
Nevertheless, the possible breakup of Ethiopia remains a serious threat, and today, unfortunately, it is more realistic than ever before. To a large extent, this is due to the country's extraordinary ethnic diversity. There are more than 80 different nationalities and ethnic minorities in Ethiopia. Moreover, these vary in size; some number tens of millions of people, while others number only a few hundred thousand. There is also historical animosity between the different nationalities. Of course, economic factors also play a role here.
The example of Eritrea
Ethiopia has already experienced one case of secessionism, namely the independence of Eritrea. Although Eritrea historically belonged to Ethiopia, it had been part of the Italian colonial empire since the 19th century and was also culturally distinct. After World War II, the then Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I succeeded in gaining Eritrea. Although it seemed that Eritrea would be an asset to Ethiopia, as it gave it access to the sea, the opposite was true. The proud Eritreans never reconciled themselves to Abyssinian rule, and riots broke out almost immediately after the occupation of Eritrea in 1952. These gradually escalated into a bloody civil war. The war intensified even further after the overthrow of the Ethiopian empire in 1973 and the establishment of the Marxist Derg regime. The Marxist government decided to solve the problem of rebellious Eritrea by force, with considerable help from the then Soviet Union and Cuba.
However, the Eritreans managed to resist and eventually won the war, and in 1991, independent Eritrea was established. But even Eritrea's independence did not lead to real peace. After only a few years, relations between the two countries deteriorated again, gradually escalating into a short but extremely intense war between 1998 and 2000. This shows us what would happen if another state or even several states separated from Ethiopia—it would not lead to a calming of the situation, as one might think, but rather the opposite. Unrest would certainly soon break out again between the new state or states and the rest of Ethiopia, and this would gradually escalate into war. Nevertheless, the example of Eritrea is inspiring for many.
Current activities of resistance groups
At first glance, there is no danger of this happening. This is partly because Ethiopia is no longer ruled by a harsh Marxist regime. Ethiopia is a relatively democratic country, at least by African standards. However, its extraordinary ethnic diversity leads virtually all Ethiopian governments to pursue strong centralization efforts. These, in turn, provoke resistance among the ethnic groups. In addition, there are various historical animosities between the individual Ethiopian ethnic minorities. This is further exacerbated by Ethiopia's large population and the size of some of the Ethiopian ethnic groups. Some have tens of millions of inhabitants, more than many countries, which underscores the ambitions of their leaders and motivates them to resist the central government.
The Oromo occupy a special position among the various Ethiopian nationalities. They are the most numerous ethnic group—according to some data, the Oromo ethnic group has almost 40 million inhabitants. In addition, the Oromo territory is rich in economic resources—fertile land, as well as deposits of gold and some other metals. However, the real political power of the Oromo does not correspond to this. The Oromo are predominantly Muslim, specifically Sunni, and as a result, they have a de facto subordinate position in predominantly Christian Ethiopia. This has repeatedly led to conflicts between Oromo representatives and the central government. In 2014, for example, unrest escalated into armed resistance, which the Ethiopian army struggled to suppress.
The situation in the Oromo region is further complicated by its proximity to the capital, Addis Ababa. Relations with the central government are therefore much more tense. The central government fears the possibility of Oromo attacks on the capital, and conversely, the proximity of central authorities facilitates the deployment of the army against the Oromo.
Since the unrest in 2014, the situation in the Oromo region has been relatively stable. In recent years, however, following the overall deterioration of the situation in the country, the Oromo group and its OLF militia have become more active. This is mainly in defense against attacks by other ethnic groups, but there is also resistance against government forces trying to disarm the OLF.
The Tigrayans, on the other hand, are a less numerous but politically much more significant ethnic group in Ethiopia. It was the Tigrayans who led the resistance against the former Marxist government, with their TPLF organization working closely with the main Eritrean resistance organization, the EPLF. After the fall of the communist regime, the main representative of the Tigrayans, Melas Zenawi, became Ethiopian prime minister and de facto ruler of Ethiopia, with members of the Tigrayan community occupying many key positions in the state administration.
Soon after Eritrea gained independence, however, the former allies, the Tigrayan TPLF and the Eritrean EPLF (which became the main and de facto only political party in Eritrea), became enemies. The situation escalated to such an extent that when war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, it was the Tigrayan militias that bore the brunt of the fighting. It was also the Tigrayans who suffered the most casualties in the war.
That is why, when a new government came to power after the death of M. Zenawi in 2010 (in which there were almost no figures of Tigrayan origin) and began to seek friendlier relations with Eritrea, the Tigrayan minority rebelled against it. The situation gradually escalated to the point where a full-scale civil war broke out in the Tigray region. Somewhat surprisingly, the Tigray militias gained the upper hand over the army, which they managed to defeat in several regular battles. In the end, the Tigrayans even declared their own state, although no one recognizes it.
The Tigrayans even created their own regular armed forces. The Tigrayans managed to capture a number of heavy weapon systems from the Ethiopian army, including T-62 and T-72 tanks and armored personnel carriers, enabling them to create entire armored units. The Tigrayans also acquired powerful S-75 and S-125 anti-aircraft systems, which complicates air strikes against their units by the central army. The Tigrayans even captured heavy A200 rocket launchers and repeatedly threatened to fire them at the capital. It is this impressive arsenal that is the reason why the army is unable to defeat the rebellious Tigrayans.
It was precisely these successes that led to an increase in the self-confidence of the Tigrayans and strengthened their ambitions. The Tigrayans thus began to increasingly distance themselves from another significant Ethiopian ethnic group, the Amharas. The reasons were quite prosaic—the Tigrayans wanted to acquire fertile pastures located in Amhara territory. The central government did not defend the rights of the Amharas in any way; on the contrary, it took very harsh measures against them and thus de facto sided with the Tigrayans, which is surprising given the political resistance of the Tigrayans. However, this only added fuel to the fire, and the Amharas became even more active. The Amharas even followed the example of the Tigrayans and created their own Fano militia. And although the Fano cannot match the Tigrayans in terms of numbers or weaponry, it is still a relatively effective military force, as the Amharas compensate for their lack of heavy weaponry with their traditional fighting spirit.
The fact that both the central government in Addis Ababa and the Tigrayans have focused on fighting the Amharas is one of the greatest absurdities of the current civil war, and the Amharas themselves perceive it as a historical injustice. Although they are now only a small ethnic group, the Amharas were at the very roots of Ethiopian statehood. It was the Amharas who created the first state formations in Ethiopia and laid the foundations for the unique Ethiopian cultural and spiritual tradition (in contrast, the Tigrayans are associated with the former Aksum Empire, which shows us that the current animosity between the Tigrayans and Amharas has deep historical roots). For centuries, the Amharas occupied a superior position in Ethiopia and ruled de facto – both the former empire and the later Marxist regime were based on figures of Amhara origin (which is another reason why some other groups have such strong animosity towards the Amharas). It is therefore perhaps significant that the Amhara ethnic group, which is so intrinsically linked to Ethiopian national identity and Ethiopian statehood, is now most threatened – both by the central government and by the Tigrayans.
Everyone against everyone
The situation has reached a point where both the Oromo and the Tigrayans are in opposition to the central government. The Tigrayans are also fighting against the Amharas, both for political and purely economic reasons. The Amharas are fighting against both the Tigrayans and the central government. Other minorities who feel threatened by these conflicts are also joining the fight, with some forming their own militias. This has created a confusing mix that even the Ethiopian people themselves can no longer understand.
External actors are also getting involved in this civil war. Eritrea, which has tense relations with the Tigrayan TPLF, has already openly joined the war—and it is somewhat absurd that Eritrea has thus become a de facto ally of the Ethiopian central government. Similarly, Egypt, which has clashed politically with Ethiopia over the construction of the giant Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and would benefit from Ethiopia's weakening, is involved in the conflict by supporting (primarily through arms supplies) certain Ethiopian ethnic groups. This, however, further complicates the situation.
The problem for Ethiopia is that there is no political figure who can unite the various ethnic groups (and their interests). Another problem is the insufficient strength of the Ethiopian army, which has been neglected for many years. Ethiopia now has a huge army of half a million soldiers, but it is still desperately under-armed. It lacks both classic heavy weapon systems and modern combat systems. Therefore, even a classic military solution cannot be applied. Moreover, the situation in Ethiopia is getting worse instead of improving. The breakup of Ethiopia into several states and small states is thus becoming an increasingly realistic scenario.
