Putin’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile RS-28 Sarmat – Satan 2 is rather a propaganda tool
On April 20, 2022, Russia conducted the first successful test launch of its RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, nicknamed “Satan 2” by NATO. The launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome marked a symbolic step in Russia’s show of force at a time when international tensions over the war in Ukraine were reaching a peak.
In the shifting landscape of strategic arsenals, one name keeps coming up: Satan 2. Behind this formidable name lies a project that is at once technical, symbolic, and geopolitical, which Moscow intends to use as the cornerstone of its nuclear deterrence doctrine. Between bombastic statements and technical setbacks, let’s try to understand the real story.
Putin: No existing missile defense systems can defeat the Sarmat
Developed by the Makeyev Design Bureau, the RS-28 Sarmat is intended to replace the old Soviet-era SS-18 Satan, which has become obsolete in the face of modern anti-missile systems. With a mass exceeding 200 tons and a payload capacity of 10 to 15 independent nuclear warheads, this missile represents a new generation of ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) with multiple payloads. “This missile is invincible against all existing missile defense systems,” Vladimir Putin said after the first successful test. The missile can reach targets over 18,000 kilometers away, thanks to innovative propulsion and a potentially orbital trajectory that bypasses conventional interception systems. With a speed of 7 km per second, the Sarmat could connect Moscow to London in less than 7 minutes. If proven, this performance would give Russia a strike capability unmatched anywhere in the world.
Despite these triumphant announcements, the Satan 2’s trajectory has not been without setbacks. The first rocket launch took place after years of delays caused by financing difficulties and technical problems in april 2024. The missiles were originally supposed to be put into service in 2021. However, by September 2024 only one missile has been successfully launched without incident. On September 21, 2024, a test ended in another resounding failure, documented by satellite images showing a crater several dozen meters wide at the Plessetsk site. According to analysts, the missile exploded in its silo or shortly after ignition. This is the second documented failure out of only three known tests to date. This calls into question the claims of the Russian authorities, who asserted that “the Sarmats are ready for combat” as early as summer 2023.
Tool of propaganda and prychological deterrence
The Sarmat is not just a weapon system; it embodies an instrument of political pressure in Russian nuclear doctrine. It has been regularly featured in state media and official speeches. In September 2024, the speaker of the Duma claimed that the missile would “reach Paris in 3 minutes and 20 seconds.” This statement was immediately contradicted by analysts, but it demonstrates the use of Satan 2 as a tool of propaganda and psychological deterrence. This missile is also part of a broader Russian response to Western programs such as the US Prompt Global Strike, designed to strike any target in the world in less than an hour. Russia thus claims to be maintaining a strategic balance in the face of NATO’s technological hegemony.
Ultimately, the Satan 2 missile embodies both the continuity of a Soviet legacy and Russia’s ambition to compete strategically on the world stage. While its announced performance exceeds that of most Western ICBMs, repeated failures during testing and the lack of tangible evidence of its actual deployment raise doubts about its real operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, the communication surrounding the Sarmat is in itself a strategic move, intended to keep Russia in the exclusive circle of nuclear powers capable of reshaping the balance of power by simply mentioning a missile.
Russia may have fewer than ten Satan 2s
Estimating the number of Sarmat missiles currently in Russia’s arsenal is challenging due to limited official disclosures, the secretive nature of strategic weapons programs, and conflicting reports about production and deployment status. A 2019 report indicated Russia planned to rearm twenty missile regiments with the Sarmat during the 2020–2027 period, but no specific number of missiles per regiment was provided. In August 2022, Russia’s Defense Ministry signed a contract for the delivery of Sarmat ICBMs, with a reported plan to produce 46 missiles as part of the initial batch. In September 2023, Yuri Borisov, head of Roscosmos, announced that the Sarmat system had been placed on “combat duty,” suggesting some missiles were operational. In May 2022, Roscosmos head Dmitry Rogozin stated that 50 Sarmat missiles would soon be combat-ready, though this claim has not been independently verified.
As of September 2023, Russia claimed the Sarmat was on “combat duty,” but the extent of operational deployment is unclear. The missiles are intended to be deployed with the 13th Red Banner Rocket Division at Dombarovsky Air Base (Orenburg Oblast) and the 62nd Red Banner Rocket Division at Uzhur (Krasnoyarsk Krai), replacing older R-36M ICBMs. Given the reported test failures and infrastructure damage, analysts suggest that only a small number of missiles may be operational, if any, as of June 2025. While Russia has ambitious plans to deploy 46–50 Sarmat missiles, the program’s technical challenges and testing setbacks suggest that only a limited number – likely fewer than 10 – are currently operational, if any. The actual number could be lower, as Russia may still be in the early stages of deployment.
