Quantum independence: State sovereignty between lasers, chips, and geopolitics
In a world where digital dominance is becoming a key parameter of state power, quantum technologies are redefining the rules of technological and military balance. At the level of quantum processes, changes comparable to the advent of nuclear energy or cyber capabilities in the past are now underway. Quantum innovations have significant potential, particularly in the fields of encryption and positioning, which will fundamentally affect defense forces and the geopolitical chessboard. The Czech Republic, a medium-sized European country with a developed defense sector but limited resources, faces a decision whether to become an active player in this technological change or remain a passive observer dependent on foreign systems.
The quantum revolution poses a threat to current encryption technologies. Most secure military communications, government systems, and intelligence transmissions rely on asymmetric cryptography. Quantum computers aim to achieve computing power that will enable them to break such encryption in a matter of hours. The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) expects this capability (known as Q-Day) to be achieved within 5-15 years. In the military sphere, this will be a change with far-reaching consequences: a quantum computer attack can be carried out covertly, with the victim completely unaware of the compromise. The targets of such attacks will almost certainly be sensitive data in the areas of defense research, weapons systems, or allied communications.
This is not a vague future scenario; the threat is already taking shape today. There is a real danger that some countries have already begun collecting encrypted data with the aim of breaking it later. This phenomenon, known as "harvest now, decrypt later," threatens the security of documentation, communications, and agreements that were supposed to remain secret for decades. In the case of the health records of top officials, defense procurement planning, or classified information, a successful attack by a quantum computer could cause extensive damage.
The Czech Republic must therefore urgently switch to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), i.e., algorithms that are resistant to quantum attacks. The development of these algorithms, such as lattice-based and hash-based methods, is being led by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The first PQC standards were published by NIST in 2024. However, it will be crucial how quickly and flawlessly Prague can implement these technologies. NÚKIB warns that "post-quantum encryption must be implemented correctly, otherwise it can be broken by conventional means," even without a quantum attack. Cryptographic flexibility, i.e., the ability to quickly change, modify, or combine the algorithms used according to current threats and developments, will be important.
In addition to algorithmic solutions, there is also a physical approach in the form of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD enables the secure sharing of encryption keys through quantum phenomena with the ability to detect any attempt at eavesdropping. At the level of theoretical physics, this is a method of absolute security, but in practice it faces practical and technical problems (high costs, the need for specialized photon detectors, and the need for direct optical links or satellite infrastructure). The European Union is involved in this area through the EuroQCI (European Quantum Communication Infrastructure) project, which aims to build a quantum-secure communication network between member states. As part of this project, the Eagle-1 satellite is being developed, which will provide quantum key exchange between member states from 2026.
However, quantum technologies are not just about communication. They are bringing about equally fundamental changes in the field of positioning. While military operations today are almost entirely dependent on satellite positioning systems (BeiDou, Galileo, GLONASS, GPS), quantum navigation offers the possibility of completely independent positioning thanks to extremely sensitive sensors that measure the movement and strength of magnetic fields. These technologies make it possible to determine position even in environments where satellite signals are jammed, spoofed, or unavailable (e.g., underground, underwater, or during operations in electronically jammed environments).
Experience from the war in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of preparing for operations in environments without a functioning positioning system (GNSS-denied). Quantum sensors will give military users the ability to navigate accurately even without access to satellites. This will increase their autonomy, chances of survival, and likelihood of successfully completing operations. Companies such as Q-CTRL and SandboxAQ are already testing their quantum sensors in real-world applications, with systems such as MagNav achieving accuracy up to 50 times better than conventional inertial units. For the Czech Republic, which does not have its own GNSS capacity, quantum navigation could be a path to greater self-sufficiency.
However, in addition to the military sphere, quantum technologies are also giving rise to new geopolitical tensions. Just like nuclear energy in the last century, quantum science is becoming the subject of technological rivalry. China, the EU, India, Israel, Russia, and the US are investing billions in the development of quantum computers, sensors, and communication systems. At the same time, these countries are introducing export controls on key components, particularly quantum chips, superfluid helium cooling, high-precision lasers, and photon sources.
In 2023, the United States extended its export restrictions not only to chips for artificial intelligence, but also to components that can be used for quantum computing. In response, China introduced restrictions on the export of germanium and gallium, raw materials essential for modern technologies. Similarly, Japan and the Netherlands control exports of lithographic equipment, which is important for the production of quantum processors. This technological protectionism is also reflected in alliance relations: whoever controls the supply chains for quantum infrastructure controls the data and security sovereignty of others.
The current developments are a warning sign for the Czech Republic. If it does not acquire its own research and industrial capacity in the field of quantum technologies, it will become completely dependent on foreign technologies in the long term. Such a development would limit its ability to act independently, not only in crisis situations, but also within international alliances. At the same time, however, there is an opportunity to become a competent partner in European projects, strengthen the defense industry with a quantum dimension, and educate a new generation of experts who will be able to create and protect the systems of a new era.
Czechs cannot complain about their research background in quantum technologies, which includes the Czech Academy of Sciences, Charles University, the Czech Technical University, and CEITEC (Czech capital of science and technology). In combination with the defense sector and technology companies, there is potential here to create a national quantum strategy focused on military applications. This should include investment in post-quantum cryptography, the development of quantum sensors for defense, and coordinated involvement in European infrastructure.
Although there is currently no quantum computer capable of performing mass decryption in real time, the development of this technology is nearing completion. Countries that start acting today will have a decisive advantage in the next decade. In the future, security will no longer depend solely on weapons and soldiers, but on the ability to protect information, control space, and be sovereign in the digital domain. The Czech Republic must choose whether it will merely observe this future or become its co-creator.
