Trump administration prepares to "audit" pact with UK and Australia
The AUKUS security pact, concluded in 2021 between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, represents one of the most ambitious security initiatives of the last decade. Its main goal is to strengthen the defense capabilities and technological superiority of Western structures in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through the sharing of nuclear submarine technology and the development of other cutting-edge military capabilities. From the outset, the pact was seen as a direct response to China's growing influence and military activities in the Pacific.

However, in the summer of 2025, the White House announced that the Trump administration would conduct an ‘audit’ of AUKUS, prompting sharp reactions at home and abroad. Members of Congress across the political spectrum urged the president to leave key commitments to Australia and the United Kingdom untouched. They fear that questioning or slowing down the pact could weaken the deterrent power of the trilateral alliance and open the door to increased Chinese influence in the region. According to the administration, the review is expected to be completed in the autumn. The outcome could be a confirmation of the current direction, fundamental changes to the project, or even the postponement of some of its key parts. In each of these scenarios, however, strategic stability in one of today's most important geopolitical regions is at stake.
Why was AUKUS created?
The creation of the AUKUS pact in September 2021 represented a strategic shift in the approach of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to security in the Indo-Pacific. Over the past decade, the region has become the epicenter of power rivalry, with the growing economic and military power of the People's Republic of China as the main driving force. It has expanded its military presence in the South China Sea, militarized artificial islands, and significantly increased the number of naval patrols in areas of unclear sovereignty. At the same time, it has strengthened diplomatic and economic ties with a number of Pacific states, raising concerns that the region could gradually come under its influence.
AUKUS was conceived as a trilateral security and technology alliance to counterbalance this trend. Its first pillar focuses on providing Australia with nuclear submarines capable of long-term deployment and long-range operations. The second pillar involves the sharing and joint development of cutting-edge military technologies, such as hypersonic missiles, cyber defense, and the application of artificial intelligence in defense systems. From Australia's perspective, AUKUS is a significant acquisition and technology project. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, are gaining a long-term strategic partner with enhanced capabilities that can more effectively share the burden of defending the region.
On the international stage, AUKUS has been viewed with mixed reactions from the outset. While Japan and India welcomed the cooperation, France reacted negatively—it lost a contract to supply conventional submarines to Australia, which caused a diplomatic rift. China criticized the pact as a destabilizing factor and an "Asian version of NATO," signaling that Beijing sees AUKUS as a direct challenge to its ambitions or even a hostile pact.
Military balance and deterrence
If the audit were to lead to a delay or limitation of the first pillar (nuclear submarines for Australia), it would weaken the most valuable element of allied deterrence in the submarine domain. AUKUS anticipates the sale of 3–5 Virginia-class submarines, aiming for a fleet of about eight Australian boats. The first deliveries are broadly associated with the period after 2032, but at the same time, US production capacity is insufficient in the long term (approximately 1.2 submarines per year against a target of 2). In the long term, in the 2040s, joint development of the AUKUS-SSN design is expected with the United Kingdom, and the submarines will be manufactured in Australia. For China, this means a longer "window of opportunity" in the Western Pacific: fewer allied nuclear attack submarines means easier planning of anti-submarine and anti-ship operations, more room to exert pressure in the South China Sea and on ASEAN countries. From a military-operational perspective, undersea superiority is critical precisely because it is difficult to counterbalance with other means.
Possible scenarios for the future development of AUKUS
The autumn AUKUS audit will be a key moment for the future of alliance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Based on the political signals and positions of the main players to date, three basic scenarios can be predicted:
- Confirmation of the existing framework: in this scenario, the review will confirm the full continuation of both pillars of the pact – the construction of nuclear submarines for Australia and the development of advanced technologies. Politically, this would be a clear signal of unity and determination to counter Chinese influence, not only for the region but also for other allies, such as Japan and the Philippines. For US and UK industry, demand for shipyards, subcontractors, and technologies would remain stable. The disadvantage is that this approach does not address the long-term capacity problems of US shipyards, and therefore the submarine fleet would expand slowly.
- Redirecting priorities to "faster" technologies: the administration could decide to limit investment in the first pillar and focus on systems from the second pillar: hypersonic weapons, cyber defense, and artificial intelligence. These capabilities can be deployed more quickly and with fewer production bottlenecks. The advantage is greater flexibility and a faster response to Chinese actions in the region, while the disadvantage is the loss of long-term undersea superiority, which is key to deterrence. Australia could perceive this change as a weakening of commitments, which would undermine mutual trust.
- Postponement or reduction of the pact: the most radical option involves postponing part of the project, such as the delivery of the first submarines or reducing the entire fleet. Such a move could be justified by budget savings, but regionally it would be perceived as a retreat by the US from its position as a security guarantor. China would thus gain a longer period of relative freedom in the Western Pacific, accelerating its efforts to consolidate control over the South China Sea and weaken political cohesion within the Quad and other security formats.
The strategic core of the problem
Regardless of the final outcome of the audit, it is clear that AUKUS has not only a military but also a political and symbolic dimension for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Any changes will be closely watched not only in Beijing but also in Tokyo, Delhi, and other major cities in the region. The decision in the autumn of 2025 could thus fundamentally affect the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific for the next decade.