Beyond Brotherhood: Unpacking the China-Russia Joint Submarine Exercise
In a significant development reflecting their deepening collaboration, Chinese and Russian submarines have recently completed a joint patrol, sending a clear message to the international community: the United States should consider the implications of confronting an emerging China-Russia strategic partnership. Though this specific exercise involved just two underwater vessels, its symbolic weight is considerable.
According to Lyle Goldstein, who directs the Asia Program at Defense Priorities, this initiative primarily represents "an effort at deterrence." While the prospect of both nations engaging in a simultaneous conflict with the West seems unlikely, Goldstein suggests they aim to cultivate an impression that such a scenario could materialize. For Beijing and Moscow, this joint submarine operation marks a pivotal moment in their military cooperation. A Chinese military analyst conveyed to China's Global Times that this inaugural joint patrol underscores a high degree of strategic mutual trust, demanding not only advanced technical proficiency but also extensive operational coordination for submarine-to-submarine contact.
The recent patrol featured the Russian submarine Volkhov alongside a Chinese counterpart, both Kilo-class diesel-electric boats. They were accompanied by two Russian surface vessels, specifically the corvette Gromkiy and a submarine rescue craft. These vessels navigated the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan in August, following a broader joint China-Russia anti-submarine exercise earlier that month, which integrated both surface ships and aircraft. The Volkhov’s journey spanned 2,000 miles, concluding its deployment in Vladivostok, as reported by the Russian newspaper Izvestia.
The choice of Kilo-class submarines, a 1970s Soviet design recognized for its acoustic stealth, was deemed a "logical choice." Goldstein points out that China previously acquired this type of submarine from Russia, ensuring compatible capabilities for seamless joint training. More telling, perhaps, was what these nations opted not to do: deploy their nuclear-powered submarines. This strategic omission likely stems from a reluctance to unveil the advanced capabilities of their most cutting-edge warships to a partner who might, at some future point, become a rival. As Goldstein observed, openly, China and Russia are not yet cooperating on nuclear submarine operations.
Indeed, the current rapport between China and Russia appears to be more pragmatic than genuinely affectionate. Despite a historical alliance in the 1950s, the two nations experienced border clashes in 1969, and Soviet leadership once contemplated a nuclear strike against China. Furthermore, the Kremlin is acutely aware that Beijing considers portions of the Russian Far East to be historically Chinese territory. This complex background may explain why the ostensible allies chose to pair aging and largely identical warships. As Richard Moss, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College's Russian Maritime Studies Institute, explained, by utilizing Kilo-class vessels, "neither side divulged anything the other participant wasn't already aware of."
Despite their shared lineage in Soviet military doctrine and equipment, this common foundation does not guarantee deep integration during joint exercises. Moss emphasized that their level of interaction "does not remotely approximate" the regular, comprehensive drills conducted by the U.S. and its NATO allies.
Nevertheless, this submarine patrol is the latest in a series of highly visible demonstrations of Sino-Russian military cooperation. Since 2019, they have undertaken sporadic bomber patrols, including a 2024 flight involving four Chinese and Russian bombers near Alaska. Annual joint surface ship patrols commenced in 2021, and land-based exercises, such as the Zapad/Interaction wargame in 2021, have also occurred. Goldstein views the submarine patrol as "quite consistent with the overall pattern," describing it as "repetitive, consistent, relatively small in scope, and frequently introducing a new aspect, whether technological or geographical."
Goldstein presents an intriguing hypothesis: the submarine patrol could be a preemptive signal against AUKUS, the trilateral security agreement involving Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., which facilitates Australia's acquisition of nuclear submarines with American and British assistance and permits U.S. submarines to operate from Australian bases. He indicates substantial evidence that Chinese naval strategists are meticulously monitoring AUKUS developments, expressing acute concern about the program, and actively discussing how enhanced China-Russia cooperation in undersea warfare could serve as a "logical counter."
The ultimate depth of the China-Russia relationship will be revealed by whether their nuclear submarines eventually operate together. Should they take "that major step in the future," it could signify a "tighter and more worrisome development," potentially leading to increased high-tech sharing on the most advanced warfighting platforms. However, Goldstein cautions against overreacting to these joint patrols. He suggests that continually expanding U.S. force deployments and intensifying exercises with allies can often extend beyond their original intent, provoking a counter-reaction, a dynamic discernible in the burgeoning China-Russia "quasi-alliance."
The true strength of this alliance remains to be seen. Goldstein concludes that both nations are "somewhat chastened by the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute." They appear to grasp the inherent risks of becoming excessively close or mutually reliant. The relationship has entered a more mature phase, where there is a full understanding that their respective interests will not invariably align.
