Record Recruitment Is Not Enough. NATO Faces a Shortage of Troops
Interest in serving in the Czech Armed Forces is at its highest since the establishment of the professional army. Recruitment targets are being met ahead of schedule, and this year’s recruitment drive is estimated to bring in as many as 3,300 new soldiers. At first glance, this is exceptionally positive news. In the broader European context, however, it raises a much more fundamental question: Can NATO armies find, train, and retain enough personnel at a time of growing Russian threats? Defense spending can be increased relatively quickly. Trained soldiers, however, cannot.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has transformed the European debate on defense. NATO member states are increasing their defense budgets, replenishing ammunition stocks, acquiring new equipment, and strengthening industrial capacity. However, alongside tanks, aircraft, drones, and air defense systems, another limitation is becoming increasingly apparent: a shortage of personnel.
The Czech Republic is experiencing a positive turnaround in this regard. According to data from the Czech Army, 2,396 new soldiers joined the military in 2025, the highest number since 2004, when mandatory military service was abolished. The recruitment target of 2,100 was thus exceeded. For 2026, the army has set a target of 2,250 new recruits, and the quota has already been largely met during the course of the year.
According to the E15 website, recruitment centers estimate that the army could recruit up to 3,300 new personnel this year. At the same time, however, at least 1,000 current soldiers will leave due to age, health reasons, or conditions at their bases. The Ministry of Defense also plans to invest billions of crowns in new housing for soldiers, as living conditions are among the factors that determine not only whether people join the army but also whether they remain in service.
The Czech Republic’s success in recruitment is therefore not a final solution. It is rather an opportunity that must be transformed into actual growth in capabilities. The military does not merely need to recruit new personnel; it needs to train them, retain them, develop their professional skills, and assign them to units capable of operating within the framework of NATO plans.
The issue of personnel is becoming one of the main topics in European defense. After 2022, NATO is returning to large-scale collective defense planning. This means higher demands on ready forces, reserves, logistics, air defense, cybersecurity, and the ability to wage a long-term, high-intensity conflict.
In this environment, simply having modern technology is no longer enough. Every tank, radar, drone, or air defense system requires trained operators, maintenance personnel, logistical support, and the ability to rotate personnel. The war in Ukraine has shown that modern conflict is not merely technological; it is also highly personnel-intensive. Units must be replenished, rotated, treated, trained, and repeatedly deployed. Even the most advanced equipment cannot replace a sufficient number of qualified personnel.
The Czech Army, however, has clearly defined goals. The 2035 Development Concept for the Czech Armed Forces anticipates that by 2030, the army will have 30,000 professional soldiers and up to 10,000 active reservists. The document also notes that new capabilities may require a further increase in personnel or a higher demand for specific expertise.
This is where the crux of the problem lies. While the Czech Republic is currently experiencing its best recruitment drive in two decades, it simultaneously needs long-term growth. Moreover, it is not just about the number of soldiers. A modern military needs specialists in cybersecurity, drones, data analytics, air defense, logistics, healthcare, electronic warfare, and the maintenance of complex systems. However, it competes for these professionals with the civilian job market, which often offers greater flexibility, better working conditions, and faster career advancement.
The problem is not a Czech one, but a European one. Germany has long been hitting the limits of its recruitment for the Bundeswehr. According to Reuters, the military has still not met the target of 203,000 troops set in 2018 and is short by approximately 20,000 regular forces personnel. Furthermore, new NATO requirements are pushing Berlin toward even greater expansion. German officials speak of the need for up to 260,000 active-duty soldiers and 200,000 reservists.
Germany is therefore introducing a new model of voluntary military service and leaving open the possibility of stricter measures if voluntary recruitment proves insufficient. According to Reuters, the new system is set to begin with a voluntary six-month program, with the goal of gradually increasing the number of recruits to tens of thousands per year.
Poland is taking even more decisive action. It is among the countries that perceive the Russian threat most acutely. Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced a plan for 100,000 volunteers to participate in military training by 2027. At the same time, Poland is striving to create a much broader defense base that would include not only a professional army but also extensive reserves and civil preparedness.
France is launching a new model of voluntary military service for young people. According to Reuters, the first 3,000 participants are set to begin in September, with the number rising to 4,000 in 2027 and reaching 10,000 people annually by 2030. The French model shows that even large European armies are looking for ways to expand their personnel base without immediately returning to full conscription.
The United Kingdom provides a contrasting example of long-term decline. According to an analysis by Full Fact, the number of fully trained personnel in the British armed forces fell by 34% between 2000 and 2025, with the Army seeing a decline of approximately 29%. The debate over the British Army therefore illustrates how difficult it is to reverse decades of personnel reductions, even in a country with a significant military tradition.
Europe thus faces a paradox. Defense budgets are rising, new weapons systems are being ordered, but the personnel base is being replenished much more slowly. European armies may therefore appear stronger on paper without having acquired the corresponding capability to conduct operations over the long term. Recruitment is only the first part of the problem. Equally important is retention—that is, the ability to keep soldiers in service.
Ukraine’s experience shows that personnel are just as strategic as ammunition or equipment. An army that cannot rotate units, replenish losses, and maintain morale comes under pressure even when it has modern weaponry at its disposal. The human factor is therefore returning to the center of defense planning.
After the end of the Cold War, most European countries downsized their armies and opted for smaller, professional, technologically advanced forces. This model was suitable for expeditionary missions, stabilization operations, or limited conflicts. However, it may prove insufficient for long-term collective defense against a powerful adversary.
The Czech Republic is in a better position today than many of its European allies. Growing interest in military service shows that the army is gaining social prestige and that the security situation is changing public attitudes. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to consider the current recruitment situation a solved problem. If the army is unable to retain new soldiers, offer them a functional support system, and provide opportunities for professional growth, these record numbers will quickly be lost to departures.
It will also be important to broaden the debate on active reserves and voluntary training. Not every citizen needs to be a professional soldier, but the state should have a broader pool of people with basic military experience, capable of bolstering defense, logistics, medical support, or the protection of critical infrastructure in a crisis. Poland, Germany, and France demonstrate that European nations are seeking new models that fall between a purely professional army and a return to universal conscription.
Today, however, the Alliance faces a paradox. After thirty years of reducing troop levels, it is building its largest defense capabilities since the end of the Cold War. Funding for new tanks, aircraft, and missiles can be secured relatively quickly. But trained soldiers cannot.
Thanks to record-high interest in military service, the Czech Republic has an advantage that not every European country enjoys. However, this alone is not enough. The decisive factor will be whether it is possible to transform the interest of applicants into long-term service, capable units, and broader societal defense resilience.
The future of European defense will not be decided solely in factories, budgets, or procurement contracts. It will also be decided at recruitment centers, on training grounds, in military bases, and within the families of those considering service to their country. It is precisely the human factor that may become one of the decisive elements of European security in the coming decade.
