DGAP on the Illusion of European Defense Cohesion: The North Is Mobilizing, the South Is Hesitating
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced a fundamental reassessment of European defense. While EU and NATO member states have pledged greater investment, deeper cooperation, and long-term support for Kyiv, the practical response has been uneven. The Baltic states, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries have quickly strengthened their deterrence and resilience. Southern and some parts of Central Europe have proceeded more cautiously. These governments have questioned the need for further increases in defense spending (Spain) or expressed doubts about the sustainability of long-term military support for Ukraine (Hungary, Slovakia). Other countries, notably Germany, fall between these two poles. While they share a greater sense of urgency, they have not been as quick and decisive in taking practical steps as the countries of northern and northeastern Europe.
These differing approaches were examined in a recent study by the German think tank DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik). DGAP defined five variables that have the greatest influence on the behavior of European governments in terms of defense:
- Perception of Russia as a security threat.
- Ability to increase defense spending without triggering a budget crisis.
- Depth and breadth of public and cross-party support for defense investment.
- Extent to which countries consider an active hard power policy legitimate.
- Strength of integration into NATO and EU defense structures.
The German think tank then applied the above variables (on a scale of 0-5, where zero is the lowest intensity and five is the highest) to three case studies. Using Lithuania, Italy, and Germany as examples, it attempted to divide European countries into groups that share similar security and defense priorities.
Baltic perspective: Lithuania
The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are located on NATO's most exposed border, neighboring Russia and Belarus. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they have accelerated their defense reforms: they are increasing their budgets, reintroducing conscription, and developing total defense models that combine civil resilience with military preparedness. Their security rests on relatively well-developed but limited national defense capabilities and NATO's collective guarantees. A similar perspective can also be found to some extent in the case of the Scandinavian countries and Poland.
At the same time, however, the Baltic states are aware of the risk of abandonment, i.e., the fear that the US's strategic reorientation toward China or domestic isolationism could weaken transatlantic solidarity. They also face hybrid threats, ranging from cyber and disinformation operations to sabotage, instrumentalized migration, and airspace violations by drones or balloons. Despite limited fiscal capacity, social consensus on defense support, decisive political leadership, and the support of allies enable them to maintain ambitious defense commitments and a credible deterrent posture.
Perception of the Russian threat (value: 5)
The perception of threat in the Baltic states is at its highest possible level. Russia is not seen as a potential risk, but as an immediate and existential threat. Lithuanian intelligence services describe relations with Russia as a "gray zone between war and peace," characterized by espionage, sabotage, and disinformation aimed at weakening NATO cohesion and public confidence. The military build-up in Kaliningrad remains a key source of tension, capable of disrupting the movement of allied forces. Belarus acts as an extension of Russian pressure. Minsk facilitates illegal migration, detains citizens of the Baltic states, and allows its airspace to be used for Russian operations.
Budget flexibility (value: 2–3)
Despite limited fiscal space due to their small economies and limited borrowing capacity, the Baltic states are among the most determined defense investors in the EU. In 2026, they plan to reach historically high levels of defense spending: Estonia is to allocate 5.1% of GDP, Latvia 4.9%, and Lithuania 5.38%. The Baltic states are also significant providers of military aid to Ukraine, with each committing to donate at least 0.25% of GDP annually. This commitment, which is central to their strategic identity, puts pressure on domestic resources and may test public willingness in the future if social spending appears to be constrained.
Social consensus (value: 4)
The uncertain strategic environment has led to extraordinary consensus between governments and citizens on defense priorities. The Russian threat is perceived as existential, generating long-term public support for NATO and continued military investment. Survey results from 2024 show that 54% of Latvians, 50% of Lithuanians, and 41% of Estonians believe their countries should spend even more on defense. Solidarity with Ukraine further strengthens this consensus. The Baltic states are among Europe's largest donors to Ukraine in terms of GDP and combine material aid with sustained public support.
Strategic culture (value: 5)
The Baltic states exhibit a strategic culture based on a realistic approach to hard power, dependence on the Alliance, and proactive political leadership. Strategically, all three countries emphasize a strong US presence as a key pillar of deterrence. NATO membership remains the cornerstone of this orientation, complemented by close relations with the US and visible contributions to allied operations. The mobilization of society as a whole through institutions such as the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, the Latvian National Guard, and the Estonian Defense League anchors this approach and engages citizen participation in national security.
Institutional anchoring and alliance influence (value: 5)
The integration of the Baltic states into NATO and the EU provides them with institutional depth that strengthens their influence and security. The Alliance is perceived not only as a defensive structure, but also as a civilizational and moral certainty. Surveys confirm exceptionally high public confidence: 77% of Lithuanians, 65% of Estonians, and 50% of Latvians consider NATO to be "very important" for national security. Article 5 is a key guarantee against the dominance of Russian military power, while the Baltic states are also strengthening their preparedness by actively participating in international military operations.
Southern perspective: Italy
This section deals with public support for defense spending in southern European countries. In addition to Italy, it also considers Spain, Portugal, and Greece (France also exhibits some similar characteristics). Despite their individual characteristics, these four countries share certain cultural, social, and security assumptions that distinguish them from their northern allies in the EU and NATO. This is particularly evident in the issue of defense spending and support for Ukraine, which are complicated by a combination of high public debt, specific electoral pressures, and different geopolitical orientations.
Perception of the Russian threat (value: 1–2)
Compared to the Baltic states, Poland, and Scandinavia, southern European countries perceive the Russian threat as significantly less intense. According to Eurobarometer data from 2024, the proportion of respondents who considered the war in Ukraine to be the main threat to the EU was significantly lower than the European average in these countries (the lowest values were recorded in Greece and Italy – 17% and 23% respectively, compared to an average of 31%). Due to their geographical location and specific historical and political development, the countries of southern Europe have traditionally pursued foreign policy goals and interests that do not overlap with the priorities of central or northern Europe. Spain and Portugal, as former colonial powers, have interests that tend to be more southern and western in direction. For historical reasons and due to territorial disputes related to Northern Cyprus and exclusive economic zones, Greece focuses on the eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, Italy has traditionally directed its attention to North Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans, which it perceives as a more significant source of threats in relation to illegal migration, energy dependence, and terrorism.
Budget flexibility (value: 2)
Southern European countries face long-term macroeconomic constraints (including high unemployment), significant public debt, regional disparities, and recurring inefficiencies in public spending. These macroeconomic fundamentals, combined with a deteriorating demographic situation, significantly influence priority setting, particularly in the area of public social spending. Defense spending is often perceived as secondary or even superfluous compared to serious economic and social problems.
Social consensus (value: 2)
Different perceptions of the Russian threat and the economic context described above mean that southern European countries are generally much less inclined to increase military spending. Surveys from 2024 show that only Portugal (50%) has figures similar to those of the Baltic states and Germany, while public opinion in Spain (37%), Greece (33%), and Italy (31%) is significantly less favorable. Similarly, military support for Ukraine finds considerably less support than in the rest of Europe. Skepticism also extends to the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping mission, an option that most southern European countries tend to rule out.
Strategic culture (value: 2–3)
Attitudes toward defense spending and defense posture are strongly influenced by the historical and cultural roots that shaped these countries in the 20th century. Like Germany, southern European countries experienced authoritarian regimes that left a legacy of skepticism toward military issues and the use of hard power. Moreover, democratic transformations reinforced anti-militarist attitudes, as significant political and social movements (Catholic, socialist, or Eurocommunist) promoted internationalism and humanitarianism rather than approaches based on national interests or hard power.
Institutional anchoring and alliance influence (value: 3)
The countries of southern Europe are firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic institutional framework. Italy is a founding member of both NATO and the European Economic Community, while Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty when it was first established. Spain and Greece joined NATO relatively early on and, together with Portugal, became involved in the European integration project in the 1980s, following their transitions to democracy. Italy occupies a particularly important position in NATO: it hosts US nuclear weapons as part of the alliance's nuclear sharing system and is home to several key NATO headquarters and institutions.
Despite their long-standing membership, however, the role of these countries in the Alliance reflects the limitations described above. Anti-militarist traditions and limited fiscal capacity (with the exception of Greece, given its rivalry with Turkey) place them among the countries with the lowest defense spending in NATO. Italy's significant personnel contribution to Alliance missions only partially compensates for its limited financial burden-sharing. Furthermore, differing perceptions of threats contribute to some extent to southern Europe's distance from the security priorities of other allies. Since 2022, NATO has prioritized strengthening deterrence on its eastern flank, while Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have called for greater attention to be paid to unconventional challenges coming from the south. This leads to divergent interests and puts southern European states in a sensitive position: they must maintain strong ties with the United States, which are essential for their security, while promoting European integration and security, pursuing increasingly divergent national and regional priorities.
Medium-term outlook: Germany
Germany occupies a specific position because it combines characteristics of both the Baltic and Southern European countries. It plays a key role in EU and NATO decision-making, backed by its extraordinary economic weight and fiscal space. At the same time, however, German strategic culture is strongly influenced by the historical legacy of the 20th century. Russia's war against Ukraine, compounded by the US's retreat from some of its international commitments and the volatility of foreign policy during Donald Trump's second presidency, has challenged several of Berlin's key positions. Faced with what then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz called a Zeitenwende (historic turning point), Germany embarked on sweeping policy changes. The country also moved closer to Nordic and Eastern European states in terms of threat perception and public support for increased defense spending. Whether this change proves lasting will depend on the intensity of Russia's perception as a threat, how seriously "competitive" threats are perceived, and how significant future budget compromises will be.
Perception of the Russian threat (value: 3–4)
The invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the perception of threats in Germany. Before 2022, about one-third of Germans considered Russia a threat to national security. Since then, this figure has risen to around two-thirds across regions, genders, and political parties, including voters of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the left-wing conservative Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, albeit to a slightly lesser extent among these groups.
According to an October 2025 survey, 48% of Germans consider a large-scale military attack by Russia on a NATO or EU country within the next five years to be somewhat or very likely. German intelligence services have warned that such an attack could occur before 2029, but at the same time they have pointed out that the population is not yet fully aware of the extent of this threat, despite Russia's intensifying hybrid attacks. Moreover, the hierarchy of risks in the eyes of the public differs significantly from the perspective of the populations of the Baltic states, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries. Military threats are increasingly overshadowed by concerns about economic uncertainty (inflation, poverty), migration, and organized crime. Such a debate is not unfamiliar to other Central European countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria, and Slovakia (and to a certain extent other Balkan countries).
Budget flexibility (value: 4)
In response to the Zeitenwende, Germany created greater fiscal space for defense. Three days after the Russian invasion, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the creation of a €100 billion fund to increase defense spending above 2% of GDP. After Donald Trump's re-election, Germany went even further: it relaxed its constitutional debt brake for defense spending exceeding 1% of GDP and committed to meeting the new alliance target of 5% of GDP by 2029. Nevertheless, like the Czech Republic, it lags behind its northern and eastern European partners in terms of both the share of defense spending and military support to Ukraine in GDP.
German fiscal flexibility is supported by public support. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, support for higher defense spending rose to nearly 60%. At the same time, however, the majority of the population also supports increased spending on internal security, pensions, healthcare, and education, and refuses to prioritize defense over social programs. Until now, this tension has been overshadowed by the government's reliance on debt rather than budget redistribution.
Social consensus (value: 3)
Germany lacks the deep and stable social consensus on defense policy that is typical of some Scandinavian and Baltic states. Public attitudes toward solidarity with its eastern neighbors remain fragmented. Roughly half of Germans support arms deliveries to Ukraine, while the rest are opposed or indifferent to the issue. These differences run along party lines and especially between eastern and western Germany. In general, there are strong concerns about escalation: 41% fear that arms deliveries to Ukraine could prolong the war or threaten Germany's security. These concerns underlie disputes over the supply of specific weapons systems, particularly Taurus cruise missiles, which the majority of the public still rejects. Weak consensus and persistent fears of escalation make Germany vulnerable to Russian propaganda and disinformation.
Strategic culture (value: 3–4)
German strategic culture has long been marked by political and military restraint, a strong commitment to multilateralism, and careful balancing between Atlanticism and European orientation. These features stem from the country's experience in the 20th century: defeat in World War II, the crimes of the Nazi regime, and decades of division during the Cold War. The Russian war and the United States' retreat from some of its commitments have challenged these foundations and contributed to what some describe as a "crisis of foreign policy identity." Friedrich Merz's government has promised more decisive leadership on European defense, but it must operate in a society and political system where restraint is deeply ingrained. Disagreements within the coalition (for example, over the possible reintroduction of conscription) show how persistent historical instincts complicate efforts to take a more assertive lead.
Institutional anchoring and influence in alliances (value: 4)
Germany is firmly anchored in both NATO and the EU, and its economic power gives it considerable influence in setting the agenda. The Bundeswehr leads a NATO battlegroup as part of the enhanced forward presence in Lithuania and plays a key role in the Alliance's deterrence strategy. As the EU's largest economy, Germany also plays an important role in the decision-making of the Union as a whole. Nevertheless, it has not become a driving force behind the EU's defense industry initiatives. The need for rapid rearmament, coupled with pressure to invest in the domestic defense industry, is weighing on Berlin's traditional pro-European stance. An October 2025 survey suggests that the public is increasingly questioning this orientation: nearly two-thirds believe that Germany pays excessive attention to other EU member states at the expense of its own interests. The result is mixed feelings among allies. Many welcome Germany's increased defense commitments, but some doubt their sustainability, while others fear an overly dominant Germany promoting defense industrial nationalism.
Different priorities, shared security
The Baltic states (and to some extent Poland and the Scandinavian countries) typically score highest or near highest on perceptions of the Russian threat, societal consensus, and institutional anchoring, reflecting their geographical proximity to Russia, strong public support for deterrence, and deep dependence on NATO and the United States. Although budgetary flexibility is limited by small economies, strong political leadership and support within the Alliance enable ambitious defense commitments. In short, an intense perception of the Russian threat, political will, and Alliance support compensate for limited fiscal space.
Italy and the broader southern bloc (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and, to some extent, France) show a different pattern: a weaker perception of the Russian threat, with greater importance attached to migration, energy vulnerability, and regional instability; limited budgetary flexibility due to higher public debt and demographic decline; a fragmented social consensus shaped by stronger anti-militarist currents and electoral sensitivity; and strategic caution at the elite level. Institutional anchoring is mixed, with NATO's influence in pushing for large-scale domestic rearmament remaining weaker. Southern Europe thus shows limited ability to rapidly increase defense capabilities and politically persistent resistance to shifting spending from social needs to defense.
Germany can best be characterized as a hybrid profile. Institutional anchoring and fiscal flexibility are high, supported by deep integration into the EU and NATO and relatively low public debt. Perceptions of threat have risen significantly since 2022, with the assessment of elites remaining more stable and consistent than the attitudes of the general public. In contrast, social consensus and strategic culture remain ambivalent, similar to the Czech Republic and wider Central Europe. Historical restraint, competing budget priorities, and contentious political narratives lead only to moderate values. Germany's assessment thus reveals considerable structural capacity alongside persistent political and cultural constraints that shape both the pace of its own rearmament and the speed and scope of its support for Ukraine.
