NATO Rallies Industry in Brussels to Scale Deep Precision Strike Against Rising Adversary Output
On 10 November 2026, NATO convened Allies, established defence firms and emerging start-ups in Brussels to examine how the Alliance can accelerate delivery of deep precision-strike capabilities. The gathering built on aggregated demand signals released at the Ankara summit’s Defence Industry Forum earlier in the year and focused on cost-effective, interoperable systems ranging from high-end cruise missiles to drones and maritime strike weapons. Multinational initiatives already under way – one involving Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey on deep-strike drones, another linking Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom on ground-based precision strike – were cited as models for centralising requirements, sharing risk and shortening procurement cycles. No new contracts or delivery schedules were announced; the emphasis remained on translating operational needs into predictable industrial commitments that can support sustained production.
These systems have become central to modern warfare because the character of high-intensity conflict has shifted. Deep precision strike allows forces to reach targets beyond the immediate contact zone – logistics hubs, command nodes, airbases, industrial sites and reserves – thereby disrupting an adversary’s ability to sustain operations. In an era of dense air defences, electronic warfare and contested logistics, the ability to impose costs at depth without committing large ground formations or risking manned platforms at short range multiplies deterrent effect and operational flexibility. Precision guidance reduces the number of munitions required for a given effect, lowers collateral damage and enables standoff employment, whether from ships hundreds of kilometres offshore, aircraft at high altitude or ground launchers operating well behind friendly lines.
The war in Ukraine has illustrated both the utility and the consumption rates of such weapons: long-range rockets, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones have repeatedly struck rear-area infrastructure and concentrations, while also revealing the limits of finite Western stockpiles. NATO’s own emerging concepts layer a smaller number of high-end, highly survivable munitions with larger volumes of more affordable systems, aiming to overwhelm defences and sustain pressure over time. Without credible stocks and production capacity, the Alliance’s ability to deter or respond to aggression on its eastern flank – or simultaneously in other theatres – would be constrained by the same industrial bottlenecks that have already slowed replenishment for Ukraine.
Production realities underscore the urgency. Russian industry, operating under wartime conditions, is assessed by Ukrainian intelligence to output more than 200 missiles per month (including substantial numbers of Kh-101 cruise missiles and Iskander-M ballistic missiles) together with approximately 10,000 strike drones of various types. These figures reflect both expanded domestic lines and adaptation of existing designs, supported by imported components. Western production remains more specialised and lower-volume. Lockheed Martin has reached roughly 14,000 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets annually and recently delivered its 100,000th unit, with further expansion planned; other high-end cruise missiles and ballistic systems are produced in the hundreds per year.
European capacity for artillery ammunition has risen sharply, yet precision long-range systems lag, with flagship Anglo-German deep-strike projects targeting ranges beyond 2,000 km still years from delivery. China, by contrast, leverages unmatched manufacturing scale and has increased ballistic-missile output substantially while fielding hypersonic systems in greater numbers; estimates suggest it and Russia together could field several thousand hypersonic weapons by the mid-2030s if current trends continue. Chinese components have also appeared in Russian drones, illustrating a broader industrial ecosystem that supports high-volume production of both sophisticated and attritable systems.
The Brussels meeting therefore represents an attempt to close a structural gap rather than a one-off announcement. Allies face shared bottlenecks in solid-rocket motors, guidance components, propellants and skilled labour, while demand signals from Ukraine, NATO stockpile replenishment and Indo-Pacific contingency planning compete for the same limited capacity. By aggregating requirements across nations and offering clearer multi-year procurement visibility, NATO seeks to encourage industry investment in expanded lines, dual-use technologies and non-traditional suppliers. Interoperability remains essential so that systems developed in different countries can operate within common command-and-control architectures without erasing national acquisition choices.
The systems covered a deliberate mix of high-end cruise missiles, ground- and sea-launched systems, and more affordable drones/loitering munitions. NATO has not published a single definitive “shopping list,” but official statements and related national programmes repeatedly point to the same families:
High-end cruise missiles
- Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG (UK/France, MBDA) — currently the main European air-launched deep-strike cruise missile in service and used in Ukraine.
- Taurus KEPD 350 (Germany/Sweden, MBDA) — longer-range bunker-busting cruise missile; stocks are limited and Germany is looking at a Taurus Neo follow-on.
- Tomahawk (US) — long-range land-attack cruise missile, ship- and (increasingly) ground-launched; Germany has expressed interest in acquiring it with Typhon launchers.
- JASSM / JASSM-ER (US) — air-launched stealthy cruise missiles; high-end Western capability with relatively low annual production.
Ground-launched ballistic and rocket systems
- ATACMS (US) and its successor PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) — shorter-range but high-volume ground-launched options; the UK has joined the PrSM programme.
- GMLRS rockets for HIMARS/MLRS — the most numerous Western precision rocket currently in production (Lockheed Martin is at roughly 14,000 per year).
- New ground-based launchers and missiles being explored under NATO’s Ground-Based Precision Strike Capabilities High Visibility Project (Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Türkiye, United Kingdom).
Long-range developmental programmes
- UK–Germany Deep Precision Strike (DPS) under the Trinity House Agreement — planned range exceeding 2,000 km, covering both stealth cruise and hypersonic designs; entry into service targeted for the 2030s (reports suggest 2032 for the high-end cruise missile and 2035 for the hypersonic variant).
- Stratus (MBDA, linked to UK/France/Italy) — next-generation successor family to Storm Shadow.
- Turkish ATMACA land-based long-range cruise missile — Türkiye has announced a major national investment.
- Numerous low-cost / mass-producible cruise-missile projects (one analyst counted at least 48 initiatives involving 20 European manufacturers).
Drones and affordable mass systems
- NATO’s multinational Deep Strike Drone project (Denmark, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Türkiye).
- Various loitering munitions / one-way attack drones and cheaper cruise-missile designs intended to provide volume alongside the high-end systems.
- Maritime strike systems (ship- and submarine-launched) are explicitly included in NATO’s mix but are less often named individually.
Whether these coordination efforts translate into measurable increases in output will depend on subsequent national decisions, financing and the ability of manufacturers to qualify and deliver at the required tempo. In a security environment shaped by high-intensity attrition and simultaneous peer competition, the difference between dialogue and credible production capacity will determine whether deep precision strike functions as a reliable instrument of deterrence or remains a scarce resource rationed across multiple crises.
